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TRADING INFORMATION FOR SAFETY: IMMIGRANT 
INFORMANTS, FEDERAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT 
AGENTS, AND THE VIABILITY OF NON-DEPORTATION 
AGREEMENTS 
Colleen Melody 
Abstract: Federal law-enforcement agents use informants to help guide investigations. 
Immigrants sometimes possess valuable information about organized crime connected with 
their home countries. To persuade an immigrant to divulge such information, federal agents 
and prosecutors often promise to reward cooperation with permission to stay in the United 
States. Non-deportation is a persuasive enticement to an informant who might otherwise be 
unwilling to help; criminal groups would likely harm a known informant returning home. 
After deciding to cooperate, many immigrants are placed in deportation proceedings 
notwithstanding their deals. This Comment discusses the persistent legal conundrum faced by 
immigrant informants after the U.S. government refuses to honor a non-deportation contract. 
It begins with a review of two forms of deportation relief commonly pursued by immigrant 
informants: withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture or an injunction 
against deportation under substantive due process. For reasons specific to each, both 
approaches frequently fail. The agency theory of ratification may provide an alternative 
mechanism for enforcing some non-deportation agreements. Ratification applies to contracts 
with the U.S. government and has been used by plaintiffs in similar contexts. This Comment 
argues that extending ratification to immigrant-informant claims comports with the legal 
framework and broader purpose underlying the doctrine. 
INTRODUCTION 
Maria Rosciano emigrated from Colombia to the United States and 
settled in Arizona as a lawful permanent resident.1 After her brother was 
killed by drug traffickers, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sent 
confidential informants to secretly befriend her in hopes that she knew 
the identity of a major drug lord known as “El Indio.”2 One of the 
undercover informants became her neighbor and asked her to introduce 
him to a drug dealer.3 Ultimately, Rosciano was arrested for her role in 
arranging a meeting between the dealer and the informant. The FBI 
asked Rosciano to become an informant herself, and prosecutors told her 
they doubted she would be deported if she cooperated.4 
                                                     
1. Rosciano v. Sonchik, No. 01-CV-00472, 2002 WL 32166630, at *7 (D. Ariz. Sept. 9, 2002). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at *8. 
 4.  Id. 
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Rosciano cooperated and her testimony helped convict the parties 
involved in her own arrest.5 Pursuant to the FBI’s request, she also 
called her sister and surviving brother in Colombia to ask for El Indio’s 
real identity. Her brother refused to provide the information out of fear, 
but her sister eventually divulged the true name of El Indio. Shortly 
thereafter, Rosciano’s sister received a phone call informing her that El 
Indio would not forgive her.6 She died in an automobile accident a short 
time later after someone tampered with the brakes on her car. Despite 
conceding that that “the risk of danger as a result of her assistance is 
high,” government officials sought to deport Rosciano back to 
Colombia.7 During deportation proceedings, the immigration judge 
admitted, “[I]t is likely [Rosciano] will be killed if returned to 
Colombia” because she had helped uncover El Indio’s identity.8 
Nevertheless, the immigration judge ordered that Rosciano be deported.9 
Rosciano’s circumstances are neither rare nor new; law-enforcement 
officers employ a longstanding practice of seeking leads from immigrant 
informants.10 Federal officials often approach immigrants arrested on 
drug charges11 because they are interested in capturing bigger players in 
                                                     
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. On appeal, Rosciano was ultimately able to avoid deportation under the theory discussed 
infra Part I.B. 
10. See, e.g., Morgan v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir. 2007) (reviewing plea 
agreement from 1983); Nunez v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 226 F. App’x 177, 178 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(observing documented death threats and attempts to kidnap informant); Williams v. Att’y Gen. of 
U.S., 219 F. App’x 258, 261 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing allegations that Jamaican drug dealer and 
Jamaican police threatened informant); Burke v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 219 F. App’x 200, 201 (3d Cir. 
2007) (analyzing claim by informant on violent gangs and political-party involvement in drug 
trafficking); Vasquez v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 208 F. App’x 184, 185 (3d Cir. 2006) (reviewing claim 
brought by informant on Dominican cocaine trade); Enwonwu v. Chertoff, 376 F. Supp. 2d 42, 44, 
46, 58 (D. Mass. 2005) (1986 agreement), remanded sub nom. Enwonwu v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 22 
(1st Cir. 2006); Reyes-Gomez v. Gonzales, 163 F. App’x 293, 294 (5th Cir. 2006) (discussing drug 
informant’s fears of torture or murder); Guerra v. Gonzales, 138 F. App’x 697, 698 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(noting allegations that drug traffickers allegedly threatened informant in open court while he was 
testifying and placed threatening phone calls to his family); Builes v. Nye, 239 F. Supp. 2d 518, 522 
(M.D. Pa. 2003) (finding that immigrant’s brother and sister were both executed in retaliation for 
his cooperation), disagreed with by Kamara v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 420 F.3d 202, 217 (3d Cir. 2005); 
In re Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 281 (A.G. 2002) (discussing death threats to immigrant making 
controlled drug purchases to implicate others); Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 
1997) (reviewing claim brought by cooperating informant in drug-trafficking prosecution); Thomas 
v. INS, 35 F.3d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1994) (analyzing cooperation agreement from 1983). 
11. Not all immigrant informants are approached after being arrested for a crime. In Wang v. 
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the criminal organization. Cooperating can place an immigrant in serious 
danger upon return to his or her home country, sometimes rising to the 
level of torture or death.12 Many immigrants cooperate only after 
receiving assurances that they will be kept safe.13 
This Comment argues that the agency theory of ratification applies to 
non-deportation agreements. Part I surveys two legal claims commonly 
brought by immigrant informants and reviews the reasons they 
frequently fail. Part II lays out the elements of a government contract 
and discusses past application of agency principles to contract claims 
brought by immigrant informants. Part III introduces the agency theory 
of ratification, which can be used to prove the existence of an 
enforceable contract. It also discusses how ratification operates when 
one party to the contract is the U.S. government. Part IV reviews recent 
cases in which informants employed ratification in suits against the 
United States. Those claims were brought by U.S. citizens who worked 
as informants and subsequently sought to be paid for their services. They 
used ratification, sometimes successfully, to argue that they held a valid 
contract for monetary compensation. Finally, Part V argues that 
ratification should apply in the immigrant-informant context, where the 
plaintiffs seek relief from deportation instead of money. It discusses 
similarities between the immigrant- and citizen-informant claims, and 
argues that extending ratification to the immigrant context squares with 
the purpose underlying ratification. 
                                                     
Reno, 81 F.3d 808, 811–12 (9th Cir. 1996), prosecutors brought a Chinese man to the United States 
to testify in a heroin-smuggling trial. After the trial, the government sought to deport him despite 
the serious danger that the Chinese government would imprison, torture, and execute him for 
embarrassing it with his testimony. In Pronsivakulchai v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 903, 904–06 (7th Cir. 
2006), a woman spent over five years in federal custody without being tried for a crime, during 
which time Drug Enforcement Agency representatives asked her to write letters to known Thai drug 
gang members. The U.S. government initiated an investigation based on the correspondence and 
simultaneously sought to deport Pronsivakulchai despite reports from Thailand that the gang 
repeatedly visited her home looking for her. 
12. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(S)(ii)(III) (2000) (recognizing non-citizens can be endangered as 
a result of cooperating and providing the visa discussed infra note 15); John Ashcroft, Attorney 
General, Announcement of Responsible Cooperators Program (Nov. 29, 2001), available at  
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/doj_brief027.asp (acknowledging potential danger encountered by 
immigrants because of cooperation), permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev599n12.pdf.  
13. See cases cited supra note 10. 
MELODY 121408.DOC 1/4/2009  2:01 PM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 83:599, 2008 
602 
I.  THE TWO LEGAL CLAIMS BROUGHT BY IMMIGRANT 
INFORMANTS GENERALLY FAIL 
The government often seeks to deport immigrants who claim they 
received a promise not to be removed in exchange for information about 
criminal groups.14 To avoid deportation, immigrants commonly seek two 
forms of relief: Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection and an 
injunction against deportation under the constitutional doctrine of 
substantive due process.15 For reasons specific to each claim, immigrant 
informants rarely succeed on these theories. 
A.  Convention Against Torture Protection Requires Government 
Participation or Acquiescence in Torture, but Drug Traffickers Are 
Usually Not Government Agents 
As a signatory to the CAT, the United States may not deport an 
individual to a country where he or she will face severe physical pain or 
suffering out of discriminatory, punitive, or coercive motives.16 
Cooperating witnesses placed into removal proceedings frequently 
invoke the CAT.17 As incorporated into domestic law by regulation, the 
CAT requires an applicant to demonstrate that he or she will “more 
                                                     
14. See cases cited supra note 10. 
15. Besides the CAT and substantive due process, immigrant informants may seek an “S visa.” 
The S visa is available to a non-citizen “in possession of critical reliable information concerning a 
criminal organization or enterprise,” “whose presence in the United States the Attorney General 
determines is essential to the success of an authorized criminal investigation or the successful 
prosecution of an individual involved in the criminal organization or enterprise. . . .” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(S)(i)(I), (III) (2000). Two hundred S visas are available per year. 8 U.S.C. § 
1184(k)(1) (2000). The law-enforcement agent needing the informant’s help must petition for the 
visa on the immigrant’s behalf. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(t)(4) (2008). Federal law-enforcement officers are 
free to decline to help immigrant informants apply for the visa, even while conceding that the 
immigrant cooperated. See, e.g., Morgan v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 2007); Jun 
Ying Wang v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 993, 999 n.2 (7th Cir. 2006); Hong v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 165 F. 
App’x 995, 1003 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006); Enwonwu v. Chertoff, 376 F. Supp. 2d 42, 50 (D. Mass. 2005), 
remanded sub nom. Enwonwu v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2006); Rosciano v. Sonchik, No. 
01-CV-00472, 2002 WL 32166630, at *8 (D. Ariz. Sept. 9, 2002). The government’s failure to 
grant an S visa cannot be challenged in court, however, because the Attorney General’s power to 
grant the visa is discretionary. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(S)(i). 
16. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113; 8 
C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) (2008). 
17. See, e.g., Pronsivakulchai v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 903, 905 (7th Cir. 2006); Enwonwu, 376 F. 
Supp. 2d at 54; Builes v. Nye, 239 F. Supp. 2d 518, 521 (M.D. Pa. 2003). 
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likely than not” be tortured if returned home.18 Furthermore, the 
applicant must show that torture will be “inflicted by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity.”19 This second requirement means 
the CAT applies only if the applicant can connect the torturer to the 
government. 
The requirement of government complicity results in the denial of 
many CAT claims—even where an immigrant presents evidence of 
grave danger—because the torturer lacks a direct link to the state.20 
Builes v. Nye21 is illustrative. There, an immigrant informant’s brother 
and sister were executed in Colombia in retaliation for his cooperation 
with U.S. law enforcement.22 The CAT standard for government 
involvement was not met, however, because even though the Colombian 
government would not be able to stop Builes’s likely torture, it 
disapproved of drug-gang killings.23 
As a counterexample, the government-complicity standard was met in 
In re G-A-,24 where an immigrant showed that he would more likely than 
not be tortured by the Iranian government if deported.25 G-A- was a 
Christian of Armenian descent who showed, during an immigration 
hearing that spanned twelve years, that the Iranian government had an 
established practice of detaining and torturing members of religious and 
                                                     
18. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2008). 
19. Id. § 1208.18(a)(1). CAT protection is different from asylum because it requires actual 
government participation or acquiescence. Asylum is available to individuals who have been 
persecuted by non-governmental groups that the government cannot or will not control. Matter of 
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985). Asylum, however, is not available to anyone 
convicted of a “particularly serious crime” as defined by the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000). The Attorney General determined that all drug-trafficking offenses 
carrying a potential sentence of one year or more in jail are presumptively “particularly serious 
crimes.” In re Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 274 (A.G. 2002), disapproved of on other grounds by 
Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2003) and Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 171 (2d 
Cir. 2004). Therefore, any person who becomes an informant following his own drug conviction 
likely will be ineligible for asylum. 
20. See, e.g., Chinchilla-Jimenez v. INS, 226 F. Supp. 2d 680, 685–86 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (affirming 
BIA decision that persecution by high-level drug dealers does not rise to the level of government 
torture); In re S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1307, 1313 (BIA 2000) (ruling that the Colombian 
government’s inability to control violent narco-traffickers is insufficient to trigger the CAT). 
21. 239 F. Supp. 2d. 518 (M.D. Pa. 2003). 
22. Id. at 522. 
23. Id. at 525. 
24. 23 I. & N. Dec. 366 (BIA 2002). 
25. Id. at 366. 
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ethnic minorities.26 The Board of Immigration Appeals found that 
government thugs were “notorious” for indefinite incommunicado 
detention, suspension from ropes, whipping with cables, and severe 
cranial beatings intended to cause blindness and deafness.27 G-A-’s 
twenty-five-year residence in the United States and documented attempt 
to apply for asylum helped show, over years of hearings, that the Iranian 
government would likely detain and torture him immediately after his 
deportation plane touched down.28 
The hurdle of tracing torture to the government accounts, at least in 
part, for the low percentage of successful CAT petitions. In 2007, fewer 
than two percent of all CAT claims nationwide were granted.29 The CAT 
cannot serve as a source of protection from an extra-governmental group 
if government officials have not acquiesced to the group’s conduct. 
B.  Federal Courts Are Split over Whether Immigrant Informants May 
Invoke the State-Created-Danger Theory of Substantive Due 
Process 
Immigrant informants seeking to avoid deportation have also raised 
Fifth Amendment substantive-due-process claims. The Due Process 
Clause applies to all persons within the United States, regardless of 
immigration status.30 Due-process protections apply to a non-citizen 
even after an immigration judge orders deportation.31 
Generally, the Due Process Clause limits the government’s power to 
infringe on individual rights but does not impose an affirmative duty to 
safeguard.32 That is, the government may not deprive individuals of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law, but it has no 
constitutional obligation to protect individuals from one another.33 The 
U.S. government, therefore, has no general duty to protect deportable 
                                                     
26. Id. at 367–70. 
27. Id. at 370. 
28. Id. at 369. 
29. OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS & TECH., EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, 
FY 2007 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK M1 (2008), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy07syb.pdf (541 of 28,130 CAT claims granted), permanent 
copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/articles/83wlr599n29.pdf.   
30. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). 
31. Id. at 693–94 (citing Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896)). 
32. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). 
33. Id. at 195–96 (“Its purpose was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the 
State protected them from each other.”). 
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immigrants from dangers they may face in their home countries once 
deported. 
In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,34 
the Supreme Court recognized two potential exceptions to the general 
rule that substantive due process does not require the government to 
protect individuals from third-party actors.35 First, where the state 
creates a special relationship with an individual by incarcerating or 
forcibly institutionalizing him, it incurs an affirmative duty of care.36 
This duty arises because the government deprives an individual of the 
ability to fend for himself.37 
The second potential DeShaney exception is for state-created dangers. 
DeShaney involved a tort claim arising from Wisconsin social workers’ 
failure to remove a child from his abusive father’s care.38 His father 
ultimately beat him so badly that he was rendered profoundly retarded 
and likely to require lifelong care in a specialized facility.39 In affirming 
the lower court’s judgment that the injured child could not recover 
damages from the county on due process grounds, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that the social workers “played no part in creating” the 
abusive conditions, “nor did [they] do anything to render [the child] any 
more vulnerable to them.”40 
Since DeShaney, a majority of the courts of appeals have recognized 
the state-created-danger doctrine, whereby public officials can be liable 
if they create a dangerous situation and then place an individual into it.41 
                                                     
34. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
35. Id. at 198–200. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 200. 
38. Id. at 192–93. 
39. Id. at 193. 
40. Id. at 201. 
41. See, e.g., Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1201–1203 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding viable claim 
where police left an intoxicated woman to walk home alone on a highway where she fell 
unconscious in freezing conditions and sustained massive brain damage from the cold); Reed v. 
Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 1993) (allowing claim where police arrested driver but left 
drunk passenger alone with the car keys; passenger drove car and killed a pregnant woman and her 
unborn child); Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1993) (permitting claim where 
officers at demonstration involving flag burning allegedly did not intervene to prevent skinheads 
from beating demonstrators), overruled on other grounds by Leatherman v. Tarrant County 
Narcotics & Intelligence Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 
119, 122 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding properly stated claim where female nurse at custodial institution 
was left alone with known violent sex offender who raped her); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 
55 (8th Cir. 1990) (allowing amended complaint to make state-created-danger argument where 
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The Supreme Court has never revisited the state-created-danger 
doctrine.42 In the absence of clear signals about the doctrine’s viability, 
some courts of appeals have created specific tests for its application,43 
while others have yet to recognize it at all.44 
In the context of immigration, even those courts recognizing the 
doctrine are split over whether it can be used to enjoin deportation. 
Immigrant informants argue—sometimes successfully—that federal 
agents affirmatively create dangerous conditions by recruiting them to 
cooperate.45 The argument is that the criminals back home would not 
seek violent revenge against their returning countrymen had the U.S. 
government not used them as informants in the first place. 
The First and Third Circuits flatly reject this approach and refuse to 
apply the state-created-danger doctrine to immigration cases.46 Relying 
on separation-of-powers principles, these courts reason that application 
of state-created-danger would impermissibly intrude upon Congress’s 
plenary power to define the conditions under which immigrants will be 
admitted and deported.47 The Fifth Circuit, acknowledging the issue but 
not deciding whether the state-created-danger doctrine applies in the 
immigration context, has cited the cases rejecting the theory.48 
                                                     
estranged husband killed wife and daughter after police chief failed to enforce protection order out 
of friendship with husband). 
42. See Daniel J. Moore, Comment, Protecting Alien-Informants: The State-Created Danger 
Theory, Plenary Power Doctrine, and International Drug Cartels, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 295, 301 
(2007) (citing David Pruessner, The Forgotten Foundation of State-Created Danger Claims, 20 
REV. LITIG. 357, 358 (2001)). 
43. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1152 (3d Cir. 1995) (four-part test); Uhlrig v. 
Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 574 (10th Cir. 1995) (five-part test). 
44. See Moore, supra note 42, at 300 (noting that the First and Fifth Circuits’ have yet to adopt 
the doctrine, but predicting the First Circuit might accept it under the proper circumstances); Recent 
Cases, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1912, 1912 (2003) (observing that eleven circuits apply the doctrine). 
45. Federal district courts agreed with this argument and enjoined deportation in Rosciano v. 
Sonchik, No. 01-CV-00472, 2002 WL 32166630, at *10–12 (D. Ariz. Sept. 9, 2002) and Builes v. 
Nye, 239 F. Supp. 2d 518, 526 (M.D. Pa. 2003), disagreed with by Kamara v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 
420 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2005). Likewise, the district court in Enwonwu v. Chertoff, 376 F. Supp. 2d 
42, 74 (D. Mass. 2005), would have enjoined deportation based on the state-created-danger theory. 
Before the court issued its order, the REAL ID Act of 2005 went into effect, stripped jurisdiction, 
and required the district court to transfer the case to the First Circuit. Id. at 85. That First Circuit 
treated the opinion below as advisory and rejected the state-created-danger argument. Enwonwu v. 
Gonzales, 438 F.3d 22, 27, 30 (1st Cir. 2006). 
46. Enwonwu, 438 F.3d at 30; Kamara, 420 F.3d at 217–18. 
47. Enwonwu, 438 F.3d at 28; Kamara, 420 F.3d at 218. 
48. Lakhavani v. Mukasey, 255 F. App’x 819, 823 (5th Cir. 2007). In Lakhavani, the Fifth Circuit 
admitted its refusal to apply the doctrine once before but explained that its earlier decision was 
unpublished and non-binding. Id. (discussing Guerra v. Gonzales, 138 F. App’x. 697, 699–700 (5th 
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By contrast, the Ninth Circuit has applied the state-created-danger 
doctrine to enjoin deportation. In Wang v. Reno,49 the court affirmed the 
district court’s grant of a permanent injunction against Wang’s 
deportation after government agents brought him from China to San 
Francisco to testify in a federal drug trial.50 Following his testimony, the 
government sought to deport Wang back to China even though the 
Chinese government would likely torture him due to the content of his 
testimony.51 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the 
government treated Wang with “gross negligence and deliberate 
indifference” that affirmatively placed him in danger.52 
No other court of appeals has addressed the state-created-danger 
doctrine in the immigration context, so it remains to be seen whether 
they will extend a warmer reception than the First and Third Circuits 
have. The prospects appear unpromising; the Ninth Circuit—the only 
court to accept and apply the doctrine—has not granted deportation 
relief under the theory since Wang.53 
To summarize, immigrant informants commonly turn to two claims 
when facing deportation and harm in their country of origin because of 
information they provided to the U.S. government. Although the above 
overviews are brief, they illustrate why each doctrine often fails to 
provide relief. The CAT requires actual awareness and inaction on the 
part of government officials, which is difficult to prove when non-
governmental agents pose the threat. The state-created-danger doctrine is 
another possibility, but two courts of appeals reject it in the immigration 
context and a third has not granted relief under the theory since 
accepting it over a decade ago. Because the current legal options for 
immigrant informants rarely succeed, a new theory of relief may be 
required. With a view to finding a new approach, Part II introduces 
agency theory and its application to contract claims brought by 
immigrant informants. 
                                                     
Cir. 2005) (explaining that even if doctrine were to apply to immigration cases, it did not apply to 
the facts before the court because the immigrant had not shown an increased risk of harm if 
deported)). 
49. 81 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1996). 
50. Id. at 811–14. 
51. Id. at 812, 819–20. 
52. Id. at 818. 
53. For a recent case where the Ninth Circuit applied the theory but denied relief, see Morgan v. 
Gonzales, 495 F.3d 1084, 1092–94 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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II.  AGENCY PRINCIPLES APPLY TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
NON-DEPORTATION CONTRACTS 
As noted earlier, many immigrants agree to cooperate with law-
enforcement officials after being arrested for a crime. In the 1990s, some 
courts of appeals began enforcing immigration-related promises as part 
of the plea-bargain contract. Those courts first examined the four 
necessary elements of any government contract. Next, they applied 
agency theory and contract principles, with two circuits finding non-
deportation agreements enforceable. Although an intervening regulation 
undercut the specific reasoning used in those cases, the decisions 
continue to illustrate the applicability of agency principles to non-
deportation contracts. 
A.  A Valid Government Contract Requires That the Agent Have 
Actual Authority 
 A party alleging a contract with the government must show the 
standard elements: offer, acceptance, and consideration.54 When the 
United States is a party, a fourth requirement is that the official entering 
into the agreement has “actual authority” to bind the government.55 
Apparent-authority or estoppel theories are generally not available to a 
plaintiff attempting to enforce a deal with the United States.56 Instead, 
actual authority is required for all government contracts, including a plea 
bargain with a federal prosecutor.57 Courts have applied agency 
principles to determine the source and scope of plea-bargain authority 
when the plea includes a non-deportation promise. 
 
                                                     
54. Trauma Serv. Group v. United States, 104 F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1997); City of El 
Centro v. United States, 922 F.2d 816, 820 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Roy v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 184, 
187 (1997). 
55. Trauma Serv. Group, 104 F.3d at 1325; City of El Centro, 922 F.2d at 820; see also Fed. Crop 
Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947) (“[A]nyone entering into an arrangement with the 
Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the 
Government stays within the bounds of his authority.”). 
56. Thomas v. INS, 35 F.3d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Utah Power & Light Co. v. United 
States, 243 U.S. 389, 408–09 (1917) and Fed Crop Ins. Corp., 332 U.S. at 384). 
57. San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d 1065, 1068 (11th Cir. 1996); Thomas, 35 F.3d at 1337. 
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B.  Courts Apply Agency Principles to Non-Deportation Contract 
Claims 
Agency is a fiduciary relationship arising from a person’s consent to 
permit another to act on his or her behalf.58 The “agent” acts on behalf of 
the “principal.”59 Through express words or conduct, a principal 
manifests intent to allow an agent to act in his or her place.60 The agent’s 
actions affect the legal rights and duties of the principal, including the 
power to enter into contracts.61 Agency allows the principal “to broaden 
the scope of his activities and receive the product of another’s efforts” 
because the principal avoids individually negotiating every agreement.62 
When an agent contracts on the principal’s behalf, the benefits and 
duties of the contract accrue to the principal.63 
In the 1990s, three courts of appeals applied agency analyses to 
immigrant informants’ claims that they held a contract right not to be 
deported. Under the doctrine of implied authority,64 the Eighth and Ninth 
Circuits found that an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) could 
act as an agent and negotiate plea bargains that would bind immigration 
officials as the principals. In Thomas v. INS,65 Thomas agreed to work as 
a narcotics informant for two years following a drug conviction.66 In 
exchange, the AUSA promised to advise the parole board of his 
cooperation and to not oppose Thomas’s request for deportation relief.67 
Once deportation proceedings began, immigration officials ignored the 
AUSA’s promise and advocated deportation.68 While acknowledging 
that AUSAs did not have express authority to bind immigration officials, 
the Ninth Circuit held that the congressional delegation of power to 
                                                     
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (“Agency is the fiduciary relationship that 
arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent 
shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests 
assent or otherwise consents so to act.”). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. § 1.03. 
61. Id. § 1.01 cmt. c. 
62. WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 1 (3d ed. 2001). 
63. Id. 
64. Implied authority is one type of actual authority. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 2.02(1) (2006). 
65. 35 F.3d 1332 (9th Cir. 1994). 
66. Id. at 1335. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 1336. 
MELODY 121408.DOC 1/4/2009  2:01 PM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 83:599, 2008 
610 
prosecute crimes implied a corollary power to bind the government in 
plea bargains.69 Absent a regulation to the contrary, that power included 
binding the government in immigration matters.70 Because the 
government breached its agreement, the court ordered a new hearing in 
which the government could not oppose Thomas’s request to stay in the 
United States.71 
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Thomas court’s agency analysis in 
Margalli-Olvera v. INS.72 In Margalli-Olvera, an immigrant agreed to be 
debriefed about his knowledge of drug trafficking in exchange for the 
government’s promise either to be silent during deportation proceedings 
or to actively oppose deportation.73 The court found that the AUSA who 
made the promise had authority to bind immigration officials because 
that power was “reasonably necessary” to accomplish the larger 
prosecutorial task.74 When immigration authorities later breached the 
agreement by proposing deportation, the court remanded the case for a 
trial-type hearing on the merits during which the attorney for the 
government had to simply sit quietly and say nothing.75 
The Eleventh Circuit also analyzed the agency relationship between 
immigration officials and AUSAs, but came to a different conclusion. In 
San Pedro v. United States,76 San Pedro claimed that an AUSA orally 
promised that he would not be deported to Cuba if he pleaded guilty to 
conspiracy to bribe a federal official.77 When immigration officials 
nevertheless initiated deportation proceedings, San Pedro sought a 
restraining order to prevent deportation.78 The court examined the 
congressional grant of authority to AUSAs and found no implied power 
to bind immigration decision-makers.79 Congress expressly delegated 
immigration-enforcement authority to the Attorney General, the San 
                                                     
69. Id. at 1340. 
70. Id. at 1339. 
71. Id. at 1342–43. 
72. 43 F.3d 345, 353 (8th Cir. 1994). 
73. Id. at 348. Whether the government would actively oppose deportation or just be quiet during 
the deportation proceeding depended on whether Margalli-Olvera participated fully and truthfully in 
the debriefing process. 
74. Id. at 353–54 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 50 (1958)). 
75. Id. at 357. 
76. 79 F.3d 1065 (11th Cir. 1996). 
77. Id. at 1067. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 1072. 
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Pedro court reasoned, so Congress did not impliedly delegate the same 
authority to U.S. Attorneys and AUSAs.80 
The Thomas and Margalli-Olvera courts granted relief because they 
agreed with the agency argument advanced by the immigrant informant. 
That route to contract enforcement, however, was closed in 1996 when 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) responded to Thomas and Margalli-
Olvera by issuing a regulation governing plea bargains with 
immigrants.81 The regulation announced that immigration officials 
would not be bound by any contracts to which they were not parties, and 
required that any agreements affecting immigration be in writing.82 
Thomas and Margalli-Olvera recognized that an AUSA’s power to bind 
immigration officials was implied only—the Attorney General nowhere 
expressly delegated it.83 By issuing the regulation, the Attorney General 
clarified that deportation-contracting was not an implied power granted 
to federal prosecutors.84 Post-regulation, the implied-authority theory 
cannot assist an immigrant in proving a contract with a federal 
prosecutor. Nonetheless, Thomas, Margalli-Olvera, and San Pedro show 
that agency principles apply to non-deportation contracts, so alternative 
agency theories may be useful to immigrant informants seeking to 
enforce their agreements. 
                                                     
80. Id. at 1069. 
81. 28 C.F.R. § 0.197 (1996). 
82. Id. 
83. Thomas v. INS, 35 F.3d 1332, 1340 (9th Cir. 1994); Margalli-Olvera v. INS, 43 F.3d 345, 
353 (8th Cir. 1994). 
84. The Ninth Circuit foreshadowed the Attorney General’s regulation. The Thomas opinion 
refers to a hypothetical Attorney General order or federal regulation no fewer than three times. 
Thomas, 35 F.3d at 1339–41. Inviting the Attorney General to regulate, the Thomas court explained, 
“If the Attorney General wished to limit the incidental authority of United States Attorneys in this 
respect, she could easily do so with a section in the Code of Federal Regulations, but she has not 
chosen to do that.” Id. at 1341. Nudging further, the court stated, “As a matter of administrative 
prudence the Department of Justice might wish to have some internal coordinating procedure for 
agreements by United States Attorneys which affect the Immigration and Naturalization Service.” 
Id. However, in a case heard after the regulation was promulgated, the Ninth Circuit referred to its 
decision in Thomas as holding that a United States Attorney has the power to bind other federal 
agencies without mentioning the regulation. Morgan v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 
2007). This may evidence that the regulation is not, at least in the Ninth Circuit, an end to successful 
contract claims where a United States Attorney promises deportation relief. Morgan did not engage 
in a full analysis of Thomas or the regulation, however, because the plaintiff did not allege the 
existence of a specific promise. Id. at 1091. 
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III.  RATIFICATION REPLICATES ACTUAL AUTHORITY AND 
APPLIES TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 
Ratification, like implied actual authority, is an agency doctrine that 
can be used to prove an enforceable contract. Also like implied 
authority, ratification applies to contracts negotiated by government 
agents. Two types of ratification, individual and institutional, apply to 
contract claims brought against the U.S. government. 
A.  The Agency Theory of Ratification Replicates Contracting 
Authority Where an Agent Otherwise Lacks It 
Ratification is a theory of agency law that operates when the principal 
consents to an agent’s act after it has already been performed.85 The 
Restatement (Third) of Agency defines ratification as “the affirmance of 
a prior act done by another, whereby the act is given effect as if done by 
an agent acting with actual authority.”86 The principal may ratify a 
completed act expressly or through conduct.87 Ratification replicates 
actual authority, and its effect is retroactive; it “relate[s] back” to give 
the agent authority to contract as if he or she had it all along.88 
Therefore, where a plaintiff can prove a ratified contract, it is valid from 
the time the plaintiff and the unauthorized agent first entered into the 
deal.89 
B.  Both Individual and Institutional Ratification Apply to the U.S. 
Government 
Ratification applies to government contracts.90 In order to succeed on 
a ratification claim against the United States, a plaintiff must show that 
the ratifying federal official had actual or constructive knowledge of the 
unauthorized acts and facts upon which they were taken.91 Whether the 
                                                     
85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.01(1) (2006). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. § 4.01(2). 
88. Id. §§ 4.01 cmt. b; 4.02(1); 4.02 cmt. b. 
89. Id. § 4.01 cmt. b. 
90. See United States v. Beebe, 180 U.S. 343, 354 (1901); Harbert/Lummus Agrifuels Projects v. 
United States, 142 F.3d 1429, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
91. Beebe, 180 U.S. at 354; Harbert/Lummus, 142 F.3d at 1433 (“Agreements made by 
government agents without authority to bind the government may be subsequently ratified by those 
with authority if the ratifying officials have actual or constructive knowledge of the unauthorized 
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official had such knowledge and approved the agent’s action involves 
questions of fact.92 Courts apply two types of ratification to the U.S. 
government when federal employees contract on the government’s 
behalf. 
First, U.S.-government officials may ratify contracts “individually.” 
Individual ratification occurs when a specific government individual on 
whose behalf the ratified act was professedly done manifests acceptance 
of the act.93 The doctrine of individual ratification requires that the 
superior officer possess full knowledge of the material facts and then 
confirm, adopt, or acquiesce in the transaction.94 For example, the 
Federal Circuit refused to find ratification where an unauthorized deputy 
director committed the Department of Energy to guaranteeing a loan for 
an ethanol plant.95 Even though the deputy’s boss—an officer with the 
authority to make the loan guarantee—was sitting in the room when the 
oral commitment was made, the plaintiff did not show that the boss 
heard the promise or acted to affirm it.96 When the Department of 
Energy stopped funding the project, the construction company was 
unable to collect almost $3,000,000 in damages because the authorized 
contracting officer had not individually ratified the guarantee.97 
Second, government officials can “institutionally” ratify a contract.  
Unlike individual ratification, institutional ratification does not require 
that a specific person affirm the agent’s action.98 Instead, it occurs 
“when the [g]overnment seeks and receives the benefits from an 
otherwise unauthorized contract.”99 Institutional ratification stands for 
the principle that “knowing acceptance of benefits by those empowered 
                                                     
acts.”); Winter v. Cath-Dr/Balti Joint Venture, 497 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2007); accord 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.06 (2006) (“A person is not bound by a ratification made 
without knowledge of material facts involved in the original act when the person was unaware of 
such lack of knowledge.”). 
92. Winter, 497 F.3d at 1347 (citing Beebe, 180 U.S. at 354). 
93. Id., (looking to the behavior of the specific contracting officer to test for ratification); 
Harbert/Lummus, 142 F.3d at 1433 (same). 
94. Gary v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 202, 215 (2005). 
95. Harbert/Lummus, 142 F.3d at 1430–32. 
96. Id. at 1433. 
97. Id. at 1430–31. 
98. See Gary, 67 Fed. Cl. at 216. 
99. Id. Ratification based on retention of benefits is elsewhere referred to as “implied 
ratification,” where the principal “receives or retains something to which he would otherwise not be 
entitled.” MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, AN INTRODUCTION TO AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCS 
14 (3d ed. 2000). 
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to bind the government can result in ratification of the unauthorized 
official’s promise.”100 For example, the Federal Circuit looked to 
institutional ratification in Janowsky v. United States.101 The FBI 
contacted Janowsky, the owner of a vending-machine business, and 
asked him to cooperate in an organized-crime investigation.102 Janowsky 
was to purchase gambling equipment, bribe corrupt local officials, and 
record incriminating conversations.103 He worried that his business 
would go bankrupt if he were exposed as an informant, so FBI agents 
promised to indemnify him for any business losses.104 No 
indemnification clause was recorded in writing.105 Janowsky cooperated, 
but a short time later the FBI indirectly exposed him as an informant and 
the sting ended.106 When Janowsky sued to recover the value of his 
ruined business, the government asked the court to dismiss his claim 
because the FBI agents did not have the authority to indemnify 
Janowsky.107 The court remanded the case for trial, finding that the 
government received the benefit of Janowsky’s cooperation because the 
FBI captured one or more of its suspects.108 
In sum, institutional and individual ratification can be used to 
evidence an enforceable contract, and both apply to the federal 
government. While individual ratification requires approval by the 
government official for whose benefit the act was allegedly done, 
institutional ratification occurs when the government knowingly retains 
the benefits of a bargain. The next section reviews recent cases where 
U.S.-citizen informants employed both theories in attempts to enforce 
financial contracts with the federal government. 
                                                     
100. Perri v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 381, 401 (2002) (original emphasis omitted) (citing 
Janowsky v. United States, 23 Ct. Cl. 706, 715–16 (1991)); see also City of El Centro v. United 
States, 922 F.2d 816, 821 (Fed. Cir 1990); Silverman v. United States, 679 F.2d 865, 867 (Ct. Cl. 
1982); Philadelphia Suburban Corp. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl. 705, 707 (1978). 
101. 133 F.3d 888, 891 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
102. Id. at 889. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 890. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 891. 
108. Id. at 892. 
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IV.  COURTS APPLY RATIFICATION TO INFORMANTS’ 
CONTRACT CLAIMS FOR MONEY DAMAGES 
Although immigrant informants have yet to employ ratification to 
enforce contracts, U.S.-citizen informants have. Citizen informants 
recently advanced both individual and institutional ratification 
arguments in support of claims to monetary rewards for help and 
information they provided to the government. 
In Gary v. United States,109 Gary assisted FBI agents in a public-
corruption investigation through the use of his bond business.110 Gary 
provided information about former co-conspirators in fixing bond prices.  
He worked with several FBI agents, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern 
District of Florida, and at least four AUSAs.111 These officials allegedly 
promised Gary compensation for losses arising from the investigation.112 
After the FBI inadvertently exposed him as an informant, Gary was 
“blacklisted by every municipality and county government with which 
his firm had previously done business.”113 When the government refused 
to compensate him, Gary sued for the value of the bond-securities 
business.114 
Among other theories, Gary pleaded both individual and institutional 
ratification. While the Court of Federal Claims rejected both in his case, 
it engaged in an analysis of each.115 As to individual ratification, Gary 
failed to show that any official with contracting authority approved the 
business-compensation agreement.116 Moving to institutional ratification, 
the court emphasized that although ratification can occur when the 
government seeks and receives benefits through an otherwise-
unauthorized contract, an official with ratifying authority must know of 
the deal.117 The court found no evidence that high-level officials knew of 
the specific compensation promise, even though they knew about Gary’s 
                                                     
109. 67 Fed. Cl. 202 (2005). 
110. Id. at 204–05. Gary agreed to cooperate during plea negotiations surrounding his own role in 
the bribery conspiracy. Id. at 205. 
111. Id. at 206–08. 
112. Id. at 208. 
113. Id. at 205–06. 
114. Id. at 204. 
115. Id. at 215–18. 
116. Id. at 215.  
117. Id. at 216. 
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involvement in the undercover investigation.118 Having failed to provide 
evidence that any official beyond the South Florida U.S. Attorney’s 
Office and local FBI unit knew of the agreement, Gary could not show 
that the contract was institutionally ratified.119 
The Court of Federal Claims also applied ratification in SGS-92-X003 
v. United States.120 The plaintiff was a confidential informant known as 
“Princess” who sued under her designated informant number for 
confidentiality purposes.121 Princess, the ex-wife of a one-time narcotics 
trafficker, participated in a four-year money-laundering investigation 
designed to bring down major Colombian drug lords.122 Several Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents—including the Assistant 
Special Agent in Charge of the DEA’s Fort Lauderdale field office—
admitted to promising Princess twenty-five percent of the value of all 
money and property confiscated as a result of her cooperation.123 No 
agent had authority to make such a promise; indeed, they were 
specifically barred from doing so by federal statute, the DEA Agent’s 
Manual, and DEA standard practice.124 Princess’s efforts resulted in at 
least ten arrests, millions of dollars in seizures, and more than twenty 
spin-off investigations.125 Because of her involvement, she was 
kidnapped and held captive in Colombia for six months, and she stopped 
cooperating with the federal government after her release.126 
Princess brought a contract claim against the government seeking the 
alleged twenty-rive percent commission. The court denied the 
                                                     
118. Id. at 217. 
119. Id. at 218. 
120. 74 Fed. Cl. 637, 653–54 (2007). 
121. Id. at 638 n.2. 
122. Id. at 639. Princess had no criminal record herself. Agents approached her at home after her 
husband’s arrest to seek her assistance. Id. at 639–40. 
123. Id. at 640–41. 
124. The record was unclear on the extent to which the agent promised Princess money out of the 
Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund created by 28 U.S.C. § 524 (2000). Assuming it was made out of that 
fund, the promise violated the amount limits set out in § 524(c)(2). The court also considered the 
DEA Agent’s Manual, whose provisions the agent disobeyed as to the amount promised as well as 
the mode of payment. 74 Fed. Cl. at 645–46. Finally, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the 
Criminal Division stated in a declaration that promising a percentage of future cash seizures “would 
have been a departure from DEA’s standard practice” of waiting until the end of the investigation 
before determining if and how much a cooperating informant would be paid. Id. at 644. According 
to the Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to do otherwise complicates and compromises 
prosecutions for the DOJ. Id. 
125. SGS-92-X003, 74 Fed. Cl. at 640, 648. 
126. Id. at 639, 649. 
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government’s motion for summary judgment and allowed Princess’s 
individual and institutional ratification claims for $33,900,000 to go to 
trial.127 First addressing individual ratification, the court credited a 
lower-level DEA agent’s testimony that he communicated the promise to 
high-level DOJ officials.128 The court also found evidence of task-force 
meetings where higher-ups were likely present, even though those 
individuals expressly denied hearing about any percentage-based 
promises.129 Despite their professed lack of knowledge, the court held 
that the existence of individual ratification remained an issue for the trier 
of fact. Turning to institutional ratification, the court concluded that 
DEA officials sought and obtained benefits from Princess’s work as an 
informant.130 Because issues of material fact remained as to whether 
DOJ officials with ratifying authority knew of the deal and continued 
accepting its benefits, summary judgment was precluded on the 
institutional-ratification claim.131 
In sum, the Court of Federal Claims recently engaged two informants’ 
claims for money damages under the ratification rubric. The outcomes 
were intensely fact-based, turning on the allegations and evidence about 
what each official knew. Returning to the immigrant-informant context, 
Part V argues that the agency theory of ratification can be extended to 
non-deportation agreements made by federal law-enforcement agents. 
V.  INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL RATIFICATION CAN 
BE IMPORTED TO THE IMMIGRANT-INFORMANT 
CONTEXT 
Part II examined the previous application of agency law to immigrant-
informant claims. Part III introduced ratification, an agency principle 
allowing an official to approve a subordinate’s completed, unauthorized 
act. Part IV explored ratification’s application to citizen-informant 
claims. This Part argues that ratification is applicable to cases where an 
immigrant informant is promised non-deportation. In this situation, the 
informant would ask a court to analyze whether the government 
benefited from the information provided and whether an official with 
                                                     
127. Id. at 639, 653–54. 
128. Id. at 654. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
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authority to withhold deportation knew of the agreement. Extending 
ratification to immigrant-informant claims conforms with both the legal 
framework and the purpose underlying the doctrine. 
A.  Immigrant-Informant Claims Are Analogous to Citizen-Informant 
Claims Where Ratification Already Applies 
Immigrant informants seeking to enforce non-deportation promises 
would present ratification claims similar to the information-for-money 
cases recently adjudicated by the Court of Federal Claims. Like 
informants claiming money damages for breach of contract, an 
immigrant informant would allege that a low-level federal law-
enforcement agent made a promise that was later ratified by a higher-up 
in the DOJ. The immigrant informant is promised deportation relief, 
whereas the U.S. citizen informant is promised money. In both cases, the 
promise is unauthorized. In SGS-92-X003 v. United States, the Assistant 
Special Agent had no authority to make the compensation promise,132 
but Princess successfully alleged that officers possessing such authority 
ratified the contract.133 An immigrant informant stands in the same legal 
position; although a low-level officer making a non-deportation promise 
has no such authority,134 the promise could be enforceable if a higher-
level DOJ official were aware of the deal. 
In fact, in both the citizen- and immigrant-informant scenarios, not 
only does the agent lack authority to make the promise, but federal 
regulation expressly bars it. In Gary v. United States, two FBI agents 
and two AUSAs allegedly agreed to compensate Gary for business 
losses arising from his cooperation.135 This promise was prohibited by a 
federal regulation, two different FBI manuals, and United States 
Attorney contracting procedures.136 In spite of the regulation and 
                                                     
132. Id. at 651; see also Roy v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 184, 188–91 (1997) (determining that 
FBI special agents have no authority to contract for information in exchange for cash payments); 
Cruz-Pagan v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 59, 61–63 (1996) (concluding that DEA agents have no 
authority to contract for money). 
133. SGS-92-X003, 74 Fed. Cl. at 653–54. 
134. 28 C.F.R. § 0.197 (1996).   
135. Gary v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 202, 212–13 (2005). 
136. Id. at 213 (citing the Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 1.601(a) (2007), the FBI 
Manual of Administrative Operations and Procedures, the FBI Manual of Investigative Operations 
and Guidelines, and lists of DOJ employees delegated procurement authority by the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office). 
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directives, the court analyzed Gary’s ratification claim.137 Similar 
regulations barred the promise in SGS-92-X003.138 The regulations in 
Gary and SGS-92-X003 are analogous to the DOJ regulation139 stating 
that immigration officials will not be bound by non-deportation 
agreements unless those officials were a party to the contract. While 
those regulations circumscribe the scope of a low-level agent’s 
contracting authority, they do not prevent a superior official from 
ratifying the agreement. As long as the ratifying official has the power to 
direct immigration officials to honor the promise, ratification overcomes 
the agent’s failure to follow procedure.140 
A second similarity between citizen- and immigrant-informant claims 
is that both require the ratifying official to order other government actors 
to fulfill the promise. That is, the act allegedly ratified is not one that the 
ratifying official himself will execute. For example, in SGS-92-X003, the 
ratifying official allegedly approved the twenty-five-percent promise by 
his conduct, but the plaintiff was not asking that specific official to write 
a $34 million check. Rather, once an official with capacity ratifies, the 
burden is on the government as a whole to honor the deal.141 Indeed, 
none of the courts in the government-ratification cases reviewed for this 
Comment engaged in an analysis of which agency or branch 
contractually bound another. Instead, courts looked to whether a contract 
binding “the Government” was formed.142 Therefore, if a high-level 
                                                     
137. Id. at 215–16. 
138. SGS-92-X003, 74 Fed. Cl. at 651–52 (citing the statute governing the Asset Forfeiture Fund, 
28 U.S.C § 524 (2000), and the DEA Manual). 
139 28 C.F.R. §0.197 (1996). 
140. See Gary, 67 Fed. Cl. at 215–16 (procedure for money contracts violated); SGS-92-X003, 74 
Fed. Cl. at 651–52 (same). 
141. SGS-92-X003, 74 Fed. Cl. at 638 (analyzing whether “the Government” breached a 
contract). 
142. See Janowsky v. United States, 133 F.3d 888, 891 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (referring to breach-of-
contract claim as against “the government”); City of El Centro v. United States, 922 F.2d 816, 820 
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (whether supervisor’s ratification had bound “the Government” in contract); 
Silverman v. United States, 679 F.2d 865, 870 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (Federal Trade Commission official 
accepted benefits and contracted for “the Government”); Philadelphia Suburban Corp. v. United 
States, 217 Ct. Cl. 705, 707 (1978) (ratification may arise where “the Government” has or takes the 
benefit of property). Some courts go further, explicitly holding that promises on behalf of the 
government bind other government agencies and branches. See, e.g., Morgan v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 
1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Thomas v. INS, 35 F.3d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir. 1994), for rule that 
United States Attorneys may bind other federal agencies, including immigration officials); Margalli-
Olvera v. INS, 43 F.3d 345, 352 (8th Cir. 1995) (interpreting term “United States” in plea 
agreement to embrace multiple agencies within the DOJ); United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 
303 (4th Cir. 1986) (“It is the Government at large . . . that is bound by plea agreements negotiated 
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official bound “the Government” by ratifying a non-deportation contract, 
an immigration judge should be bound not to order the individual 
deported. 
A third similarity between the citizen-informant claim and the 
immigrant-informant claim is that success would turn on the same type 
of factual inquiry. An immigrant informant would be required to prove 
two fact-heavy elements. First, the immigrant and law-enforcement 
agent must have reached an agreement.143 While this would be easier to 
prove if a written document existed, some immigrants enter into purely 
oral contracts for deportation relief.144 Where an oral contract forms the 
basis of the claim, the immigrant may need to supplement his or her 
allegations with circumstantial evidence of the contract. If the 
informant’s cooperation included trial testimony, for example, a court 
may take judicial notice of participation in those proceedings.145 
Alternatively, the circumstances might make it unlikely that the 
immigrant would provide information without a corresponding benefit of 
remaining safely in the United States.146 That is, the more dangerous the 
                                                     
by agents of Government.”). Although the cases analyze contract claims against the government as 
a whole, all the actors in immigrant-informant cases usually fall within the DOJ. The AUSA, FBI, 
or DEA agents who most often promise relief from deportation are DOJ employees. 28 U.S.C. § 
547 (2000) (authorizing U.S. Attorneys to prosecute crimes in section of U.S. Code pertaining to the 
DOJ); 28 U.S.C. § 533 (2000) (granting authority to Attorney General to appoint investigators); 28 
C.F.R. § 0.85 (2008) (delegating authority to FBI); 28 C.F.R. § 0.100 (2007) (delegating authority 
to DEA). The immigration judges who order and withhold deportation also serve in the DOJ 
through the Executive Office for Immigration Review and are subject to “direction and regulation of 
the Attorney General. . .” 6 U.S.C. § 521(a) (2000) (creating Executive Office for Immigration 
Review); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2000) (“An immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for 
deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien.”). The Attorney General may release an 
alien detained by immigration officials, provided the individual is not a danger to the safety or 
property of others.  8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (2000). 
143. See Trauma Serv. Group v. United States, 104 F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (requiring a 
showing of offer and acceptance); City of El Centro v. United States, 922 F.2d 816, 820 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) (same). 
144. See, e.g., Morgan v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting claim because 
there was no written promise and immigrant failed to allege specific terms of oral promise); 
Enwonwu v. Chertoff, 376 F. Supp. 2d 42, 44, 51 (D. Mass. 2005) (discussing immigrant’s 
allegation that he was orally promised asylum), remanded sub nom. Enwonwu v. Gonzales, 438 
F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2006). 
145. FED. R. EVID. 201; see also Janowsky v. United States, 133 F.3d 888, 889 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (discussing federal criminal trial where informant testified); Enwonwu, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 
48–49 (examining immigrant’s testimony as part of cooperation with DEA). 
146. See Enwonwu, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 58 (crediting immigrant’s testimony that he would not 
have provided information to government in the absence of a promise from DEA agent that he 
would be safe from Nigerian drug dealers; immigrant testified, “If I knew that after I cooperated 
with the government to get [the high-ranking drug lord] that the government was going to send me 
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situation for the immigrant as a result of cooperating, the more likely 
that he or she received a non-deportation promise to elicit the 
information.147 
Along with the existence of an agreement, an immigrant informant 
would have to show that a government agent with actual authority 
ratified the deal. Discovery is crucial at this stage because it allows the 
informant to learn who knew of the promise. Such discovery was the key 
to Princess’s ability to overcome the government’s motion for summary 
judgment in SGS-92-X003; she offered depositions and declarations 
from DEA agents, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the 
Criminal Division, and then-Attorney General Janet Reno.148 Even 
where no ratifying official admits actual knowledge, it may be possible 
to prove constructive knowledge of the agreement.149 On a constructive-
knowledge theory, an immigrant could argue that the government 
ratified the contract by continuing to accept the information.150 
Recent ratification cases in the citizen-informant context support the 
position that non-deportation contracts are enforceable when a 
government official with authority ratifies them. The last section argues 
that the purpose underlying ratification further supports its application to 
immigrant-informant claims. 
B.  The Fairness-Promoting Purpose Behind Ratification Supports 
Extending It to Immigrant-Informant Claims 
Ratification promotes fairness in contracting.151 The Restatement 
(Third) of Agency states that it is “fair to hold the principal to [the legal 
consequences of an agent’s act] when the principal has, after the fact, 
assented to the agent’s act.”152 The concern for fairness also manifests 
                                                     
back to Nigeria, I’ll [sic] be the damndest [sic] fool to do that.”). 
147. See id. 
148. SGS-92-X003 v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 637, 639 n.5 (2007). 
149. See Telenor Satellite Servs. v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 114, 120 (2006) (“[T]he person 
with contracting authority must actually or constructively know about and explicitly or impliedly 
adopt the contract in question.”); Harbert/Lummus Agrifuels Projects v. United States, 142 F.3d 
1429, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Agreements made by government agents without authority to bind the 
government may be subsequently ratified by those with authority if the ratifying officials have 
actual or constructive knowledge of the unauthorized acts.”). 
150. See Telenor Satellite Servs., 71 Fed. Cl. at 120 (“[T]he person with contracting authority 
must . . . explicitly or impliedly adopt the contract in question.”) (emphasis added). 
151. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.01 cmt. b (2006). 
152. Id. 
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itself in the way ratification works, because ratification requires the 
principal to ratify the contract in its entirety and accept the burdens 
along with the benefits.153 It would be unfair to allow the principal to 
skim the benefits off an unauthorized contract while declining to bear 
the burdens that went along with it. That is why “knowing acceptance of 
the benefit of a transaction ratifies the act . . . even though the person 
also manifests dissent to becoming bound by the act’s legal 
consequences.”154 Where the principal accepts the benefits, fairness 
dictates that he or she also accept the duties or burdens. 
Ratification should be used in the immigrant-informant context 
because it produces fair results. For the immigrant, there is no way to 
undo the consequences of becoming an informant if the government later 
declines to honor its promise. In the criminal plea-bargain context, a 
breach by the government can invalidate a guilty plea and require 
remand to the trial court so that the defendant may elect between specific 
performance or withdrawal of the plea.155 For the immigrant informant, 
withdrawing the information is simply not possible and the proper 
remedy should be specific performance of non-deportation. The fairness 
concerns embodied in ratification weigh in favor of holding the 
government to its duty not to deport an informant after accepting the 
law-enforcement benefits of the information. 
CONCLUSION 
Ratification may represent a workable path to proving the existence of 
an enforceable contract not to be deported. Ratification would represent 
an alternative to often-unsuccessful claims currently raised, including 
the Convention Against Torture and the state-created-danger theory of 
substantive due process. To prevail, an immigrant informant would have 
to make specific factual showings of knowledge and agreement. Agency 
principles already apply to non-deportation contracts, and the similarity 
between citizen-informant claims and immigrant-informant claims 
supports extending ratification. Perhaps more importantly, the fairness 
                                                     
153. Id. § 4.07. 
154. Id. § 4.01 cmt. d. 
155. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (“[W]hen a plea rests in any 
significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of 
the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”); United States v. Morris, 470 
F.3d 596, 600 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding specific performance is an appropriate remedy for breach of 
a plea agreement); United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 241 (3d Cir. 1998) (same). 
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concern animating ratification weighs in favor of its use in the 
immigrant-informant context because individuals like Maria Rosciano 
should be entitled to the benefit of their bargains with American police 
and prosecutors. 
 
